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AbstractThe accident rate of rotorcraft has improved signiﬁcantly over the years but at a slow pace, and in any casethe number of accidents per ﬂight hours is one or two orders of magnitude higher than that of commercialaircraft, a consideration that could be reasonably related to the inherent higher risk associate with rotor-craft operations. This represent a strong evidence of the necessity to introduce airworthiness operationstandards also in the rotorcraft community, as an effective mean to improve safety records, borrowingfrom the experience done in the commercial air transport community with the introduction of ETOPS. Inthis paper, a ﬁrst proposal of development of a safety standard for helicopter offshore operation is dis-cussed together with the possible support to this development that could be given by the EU H2020 projectNITROS.
1. INTRODUCTION
Helicopter accident and fatal helicopter accidentrates have fallen for three consecutive years since2014. This is clearly shown in the report of the In-ternational Helicopter Safety Team (IHST) presentedat the HAI Heli-Expo this year 1. However, the cur-rent rate is still too high to be considered accept-able. Commercial airplane ﬂights have a rate of 26fatal and non-fatal accidents per 10 Million move-ments2, which means about 13 accidents per 10mil-lion ﬂights.* Already in 2000 Harris et al.3 estimated
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*Assuming that the average ﬂight time is close to 2 hours.
that it was ten times more likely to be involved inan accident if ﬂying in a helicopter than in turbo-jet ﬁxed-wing aircraft, while Fox in 20044 gave asﬁgure for the accident rate for Bell helicopters of3.9 per 100,000 hours, that is two order of magni-tude higher than that of commercial airplane.† Inany case, the comparison of the safety records be-tween commercial aeroplane and rotorcraft opera-tion shown in the Annual Safety Review 2017 editedby EASA is clear2 both in terms of global accidentrates and in terms of fatal vs. non-fatal accidents.Of course airliners operate from airport to air-port, while rotorcraft are employed in many com-plex operations: offshore operations, search andrescue, coastguard, ﬁreﬁghting, disaster relief, ter-ritorial control, monitoring and inspection, heavy-lift support to construction and other sectors, aerialﬁlming and media support, etc., and this makes ahuge difference in the realistic safety targets thatcan be achieved, given the signiﬁcant time spentclose to terrain and obstacles, often in harsh envi-
†Unfortunately, it is very diﬃcult to retrieve data on acci-dents per ﬂight hours that is the typical safety rate used in avia-tion, because it is still problematic to collect ﬂight hours for theglobal helicopter ﬂeet.
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ronment. However, the inherent higher complexityand risk of operations should rather be consideredas an incentive to develop operation standards, de-spite the large variety of type of operations maymake this objective more diﬃcult to achieve.To better frame the current rapidly evolving situa-tion, as predicted by the 20-year Annual Forecast bythe american Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),rotorcraft hours ﬂown are expected to grow at arate of 2.2% per year‡, given the strategic roles cov-ered in many critical community services by rotor-craft. And this rate of growth does not consider thepossible explosion of on-demand and personal avi-ation services for urban mobility based on VerticalTake-Off and Landing (VTOL) air vehicles that arecurrently attracting large investments worldwide5.An interesting proposal on how to properlymanage risk, and thus increase safety, has beenlaunched by Leonardo Helicopters6,7. The idea is todevelop design and operation rules for helicoptersin a fashion proportional to the speciﬁc risk faced.Safety improvements should not be linked just toairworthiness of the design, they should rather belinked to operational risk. The risk in fact is the com-bination of the predicted severity— i.e. criticality—and likelihood — i.e. probability — of the potentialeffect of a hazard8, and so it is a concept inherentlyassociated with a speciﬁc operation. In fact, risk istightly related to operation and should be consid-ered a function of many parameters related to theenvironment where the operation takes place, i.e.populated, congested, hostile as of mountain areas.This means that the higher is the risk of the spe-ciﬁc operation to be performed, the more stringentshould be the design requirements.Leonardo Helicopter launched the effort to setup an Extended range Helicopter Operation Stan-dard (EHOPS)6. The Leonardo proposal is based ona commercial airplane operation standard successstory, ETOPS (Extended-range Twin-engine Opera-tional Performance Standards), introduced in 1985to apply an overall level of operational safety fortwin-engine aeroplanes which was consistent withthat of the three and four-engined aeroplanes, theonly types allowed to ﬂy transoceanic routes at thattime, to which no restrictions were applied. Today’srule establishes regulations governing the design,operation and maintenance of certain airplanes op-erated on ﬂights that ﬂy long distances from an ad-equate airport9.A similar regulation associated with a speciﬁc op-eration in order to quantify the risk and bring it toan acceptable level could be developed for rotor-
‡https://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation/
aerospace_forecasts/ retrieved March 15, 2018
Figure 1: Offshore operation for rotorcraft.
Figure 2: Percentage of fatal accident by type of op-eration. Source EASA published in IHST 2018 World-wide Partner Panel. 1
craft as well. In this case, the proposal of LeonardoHelicopter7 is to tackle one of the most hostile en-vironments for rotorcraft operation, that is the off-shore case (see Figure 1), although the analysis re-ported by EASA in the IHST 2018 report 1 shows thatoffshore is deﬁnitely not the largest contributor tothe number of fatal accident in rotorcraft, see Fig-ure 2.NITROS—Network for Innovative Training on RO-torcraft Safety§ — is a project launched in 2016 un-der the umbrella of the Marie Skłodowska CurieJoint Doctorates Programme in the European Unionaim to train (up to doctoral level) a new genera-tion of talented young engineers to become futurespecialists in developing innovative approaches toaddress rotorcraft safety issues 10. To increase theawareness of safety issues of the researchers thatare participating in the NITROS project it has beendecided to perform this assessment of the feasibil-ity of the EHOPS for offshore operations as a teamwork.
§https://www.nitros-ejd.org/
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The paper presents the foundations of the inves-tigation to be performed by the twelve researcherson the feasibility of the EHOPS Standard and on theelements that should be included in this standard.
2. CURRENT STATUS OF ROTORCRAFT FLIGHTSAFETY
The safety of rotorcraft is clearly related to uniquemissions they are asked to perform. Rotorcraft areemployed in many complex operations close to ter-rain and obstacles and in harsh environments, andthis makes a huge difference in the realistic safetytargets that can be achieved. Additionally, rotor-craft have naturally (i.e. without any artiﬁcial sta-bility augmentation) limited stability; they have sig-niﬁcant cross-couplings of controls, being, for sometypes, potentially diﬃcult for the pilot to operatewithout losing control in harsh environmental con-ditions; when the visual conditions degrade and thepilot has diﬃculty seeing the terrain and horizonreferences, there is a high risk of spatial disorien-tation, with consequent departure from the desiredﬂight trajectory. So, it seems very important to con-sider safety not as simply related to airworthinessof the design but linked also to operational risk.Part failure represents a very small fraction of ac-cidents, so airworthiness problems contributes littleto the causes that must be primarily sought in theinteraction of the vehicle with the other elementsof the aircraft4,2. In an analysis of accident statisticsbetween 1995-2010 11, only 5% of accidents belong toairworthiness failures, while 40% are related to pi-lot awareness, skills and judgment, 10% are relatedalso to the risk associated with environmental con-ditions and another 5% to mission risk associatedwith hostile areas of operations.In the 1950s and 1960s the US Air Force BallisticMissile Division introduced the concept of systemsafety, where one of the key aspects was that ev-erything contributes to the response of the systemand so all failures— of parts of the aircraft but alsoof the human operators, the management system,and the environment— affect the ﬁnal outcome ofthe system4. In the helicopter world most of thetimes the system has been considered the entireaircraft4. However, to manage risk properly, and soincrease safety, it is important to take into accountthe other elements that contribute to the systemand consequently develop an approach to safetythat is linked to operational risk. The designer mustbe able to identify clearly the risks associated withany design choice in relation to the different opera-tive scenarios. Additionally, it will allow to erase themyths such as “Twin-engine helicopters are always
safer than single engine helicopters. The rest of theaircraft other than the engines are the same on sin-gle or twin-engine helicopters, so it can be disre-garded”4, that tend to ignore that risk is intimatelyassociated with the type of mission, and that in spe-ciﬁc situations with the appropriate safety assess-ment a ﬂight on a single engine rotorcraft could besafer.Disproving such a myth in aviation was per-fectly exempliﬁed by the development of the ETOPS.
3. ETOPS, A SUCCESS STORY
The ETOPS is a set of regulations for passenger air-craft developed as an exception to overcome the ef-fect of the FAA 121.161, denominated the 60-minuterule. In fact in 1953, the FAA adopted a rule that pro-hibited aircraft with less than four engines from ﬂy-ing more than 60minutes to reach the nearest suit-able airport in response to an engine failure.The 60minutes rule was the logical consequenceof the comparatively low reliability of piston en-gines, and of an unconditional faith on the generalrule that more engines are always better, no mat-ter how the rest of the systems of the aircraft areconceived.The higher reliability of jet engines, that requiredalso less maintenance, sparked the idea on aircraftmanufactures to develop airliners with less enginesthat could be more fuel-eﬃcient and have loweroperational costs and better operational ﬂexibility.This idea was supported by airlines who saw theeconomic advantage.The initial opposition of the regulator was notspeciﬁcally related to engine reliability, but more tothe capabilities of a single engine to power criticalsub-systems while being the only source of thrust 12.A clear example was related to de-icing systems: op-erating an aircraft on single engine will force to ﬂyat peak icing altitude, so it was correct to ask if theonly active engine was enough to power electric, hy-draulic avionic and de-icing systems.In July 1984 the FAA issues a draft advisory cir-cular for twin-engine extended operations includingsix main design criteria:
1. show an acceptable low risk of double enginefailure from independent causes;
2. demonstrate the reliability of the propulsionsystem by in-service experience;
3. ensure that critical systems could be opera-tional if engine fails;
4. assess the air carrier andmanufacturer’smain-tenance programs to demonstrate that theyare able to reach the reliability level required;
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5. review the training, operation and mainte-nance programs of airlines;
6. apply fail-safe criteria for the design of criticalsystems.
Interestingly, the introduction of ETOPS did notrely simply on a request of higher reliability of en-gines, but sparked the attention to the redundancyof systems, general reliability and also to trainingandmaintenance procedures. In the end, it resultedin a standard designed to preclude failure and mal-function that could cause a diversion from the in-tended mission, or, in case a diversion is necessary,to perform it in the safest way 12. This called for sev-eral changes:
• the aircraft and engine manufacturers wereforced to follow design processes that resultedin higher reliability;
• the airlines were required to qualify indepen-dently for extended range operations, provid-ing detailed information about the mainte-nance, inspection and replacement programs.
Several important safety features were enhancedwith the constraint to keep the level of safety forthe length of the longest possible diversion, like on-board ﬁre suppression systems.The beneﬁt of this risk assessment-based ap-proach, lead to application of the ETOPS approachto all aircraft. Airlines started to apply ETOPS prac-tice to ETOPS-exempt aircraft, and the same hap-pened for design procedures. In 2007 the deﬁnitionof the acronym was changed to simply "extendedoperations" to clarify that the set of rules developedshould be applied to all passenger airplanes withmore than one engine.So, it is possible to state that the introductionof ETOPS “improved the safety of commercial avi-ation: no ETOPS ﬂight has been lost because of adanger that ETOPS was meant to address” 12. Ad-ditionally, all actors gained advantages. The man-ufacturers were allowed to better market aircraft;in fact, twin-engine products have signiﬁcantly in-creased the number of ﬂying aircraft. Airlines havemore ﬂexible aircraft, that better satisfy the requestof passengers of more direct ﬂights. The regulationauthorities promoted safety in civil aviation, and thesociety as a whole beneﬁted from the faster diffu-sion of smaller, more fuel-eﬃcient airplanes. Cur-rently, more twin-engine aircraft cross the trans-oceanic routes that three- or four-engine ones.
4. EHOPS CERTIFICATION FOR HELICOPTER OP-ERATION
The application of ETOPS principles to Helicopters,in what has been termed Extended Helicopter Op-erations (EHOPS) has been recently proposed in Ref.7. The application of this idea to offshore tasks isparticularly challenging. Offshore operations per-formed by helicopters are typically related to: move-ment of people to and from their workplaces onoffshore facilities and vessels; equipment inspec-tion; freight transportation; emergency evacuation;search and rescuemissions; construction andmain-tenance of offshore wind farms; construction andmaintenance of offshore oil and gas platforms; var-ious ship operations. All those operations pose spe-ciﬁc risks to helicopter operations related to the ad-verse environment where they are performed.The starting point to understand the possibility toapply the ETOPS approach to rotorcraft offshore op-erations is the analysis of the AMC-20-69. It is possi-ble to map the different elements discussed in thisstandard to the following seven topics:
1. System requirements and design
2. Safety Requirements for EHOPS
3. Maintenance Requirements for EHOPS
4. RFM Procedures for EHOPS
5. MMEL/MEL for EHOPS operation
6. Human factors and operational aspects
7. Training aspects
An initial analysis of all those aspects could befound in Ref. 7.It is important to note the large emphasis thatthe ETOPS design criteria pose on fail-safe criteriafor design. In helicopters there are several systemswhere single Hazardous and Catastrophic failuremodes are possible, as either single failure modesor single failure modes in association with failureof monitoring system. Those are particularly criticalfor the parts that belong to the Rotor System, in-cluding the Control Chain and the Rotor Drive Sys-tem.In this case the approach to be followed could notbe based on reliability by redundancy or fail-safe ap-proaches, as often used in ETOPS, but more on highreliability obtained as combination of design, main-tenance, inspection and replacement requirements.Damage Tolerance including safety margins vs. ex-ternal, maintenance induced damages and manu-facturing ﬂaws, must be combined with appropriate
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and reliable health monitoring systems to reach anacceptable risk of failure to be demonstrated, alsoby in-service experience as done for ETOPS.Additionally, further detailed analysis in the caseof helicopters with respect to airplanes will be re-quired for take-off and landing procedures. Start-ing from the deﬁnition of operations categorizationbased on Take-Off and Landing operations, Perfor-mance Class 1 & 2 (PC1 & PC2) are scrutinized in thecontext of offshore operations. Both performanceclasses require that in case of a critical power-unitfailure, performance must be available to enablethe helicopter to safely continue to an appropri-ate landing area, unless the failure occurs duringtake-off or landing. In PC1, a failure before reach-ing the take-off decision point (TDP) or after pass-ing the landing decision point (LDP) must leave thehelicopter with the capability to land within the re-jected take-off or landing area. In PC2, however, itis suﬃcient that the helicopter is able to make aforced landing. PC2 does not seem adequate, sinceit exposes the helicopter to potentially catastrophicrisks due to engine failure, which are not paral-leled by analogous classiﬁcations for CommercialAir Transport (CAT) related to ﬁxed wing aircraft.PC2 operations are currently permitted by opera-tion regulations with additional measures that areintended to mitigate the risk exposure associatedwith some engine failures.In any case, in the deﬁnition of extended oper-ation standards, helicopters present an additionaldegree of freedom that should be accounted: thecapability to land in areas not speciﬁcally designedas landing areas. In offshore operations, continuingto an appropriate landing area might represent toostrict a requirement. Helicopters for offshore oper-ations have the capability to ditch. The applicationof ETOPS principles requires one to consider failuremodes that might force the helicopter to land onwater.Of course, ditching is less desirable than land-ing on an appropriate area. As such, two typesof analysis need to be taken into account. In theﬁrst scenario, an appropriate landing area must bereached. In the second one, successfully ditching insafe conditions is considered. The primary objectivewould be to use ETOPS principles to avoid ditchingin the ﬁrst place. Both analyses aim at deﬁning whatchanges are required in the design of the helicopterto reach an acceptable diversion distance and timeto reach what in the context of EHOPS is equiva-lent to the alternate landing site of ETOPS, i.e. a safelanding site as the preferred choice or, as a secondchoice, a safe place for successful ditching and sub-sequent rescue.Typically, helicopters operate within much
shorter distances, compared to large jet airliners.However, they also ﬂy at much lower cruise speeds,which may further reduce in case of one engineinoperative (OEI) conditions. Furthermore, espe-cially in case of offshore operations, there mightbe no alternate landing sites, or they might beat distances at least comparable to those of thedeparture or destination sites. As such, very oftenan alternate landing site is either not availableor not preferable, in terms of distance and time,unless the closest between the departure or desti-nation sites becomes unavailable for other reasons(e.g. weather conditions). Typically, in those cases,diversion times between 30min and 2 hours wouldbe necessary to avoid ditching. However, such aduration is beyond the current and foreseeablesafety objective of critical systems, like rotors andtransmission, in terms of residual risk of continuousoperation in case of many types of ﬁrst failures.Consequently, many operations might not meetthe requirement of reaching a safe landing site.In those cases, the distance and time required toreach a place for safe ditching and subsequentrescue is the only possibility to deﬁne a possibleEHOPS route. Considering the limited range andspeed of helicopters, compared to those of largejet airliners, typical ﬂights can be considered localin terms of variability of geographical and environ-mental characteristics, making the deﬁnition of riskscenarios of EHOPS operations easier for speciﬁcgeographic areas and seasons. These aspects canplay a very important role in deﬁning the sustain-ability of commercial operations, which involvesthe capability of successfully operating routinelywith suﬃciently high success rates, in terms ofaccomplishing the mission instead of aborting it,regardless of, e.g., environmental conditions.Scenarios can signiﬁcantly change, within a spe-ciﬁc geographical area, for example because of theseason. Different seasons imply different expectedaverage weather conditions, for example in termsof likelihood of encountering icing conditions, or ofpassenger and crew survival time in water after asuccessful ditching that results in an evacuation ofthe helicopter prior to rescue. Encounters with icingconditions could result in cancellation of the ﬂight,in case the helicopter is not equipped with appro-priate anti-icing systems (both in terms of capabili-ties and reliability), whereas the need to ensure saferescue in case of ditching would require the routeto remain within a prescribed maximum distancefrom available search and rescue (SAR) services inthe related Risk Scenario. Allowing the possibility ofsafe ditching alleviates the requirement of long di-version times, but introduces the need to updatethe helicopter in order to provide adequate ditch-
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ing capabilities, along with the related requirementson operations, maintenance and training. The anal-ysis of the risk scenario could introduce further lim-itations, e.g. on the visual conditions (for examplerestricting operations to daylight conditions). Otherelements in the risk scenario that may be charac-teristic of the type of operations are, for example,bird impact, which unlike large ﬁxed wing jet airlin-ers is not limited to take-off and landing, but maybe present during much longer operation phases,and lightning strikes. Several types of reliability is-sues need to be addressed:
• engine reliability in relation to loss of thrustcontrol (LOTC) and in ﬂight shut down (IFSD)rates, with special attention to the risk of dualengine failure in one ﬂight;
• system level reliability, including reliability ofsecondary / back-up systems or warning sys-tems which, in case of false indications, couldinduce the crew to carry out an unnecessaryditching;
• capability of design features targeted to allowcontinued operation in the event of a failure(e.g. ﬁre suppression, main gear box (MGB)loss of oil capability, time-limited electrical sys-tem capability).
Periodic reviews, at least yearly, of the risk sce-narios is necessary, since some of the sources ofrisk may vary. EASA’s Annual Safety Review, for ex-ample, is a tool that may be used to produce SafetyRisk Portfolios based on events happened duringthe preceding years.The deﬁnition of agreed risk scenarios for EHOPSoperations is a key element for innovating the ap-proach to enhancing helicopter operations, whichmust be matched with a Safety Objective. Meetingsuch objective requires combining compliance todesign requirements by the OEM with complianceto operational requirements by the operator. Froman operator’s point of view, the Mission RelatedSafety Objective of a single mission may need to becomplemented with a Cumulative Safety Objective,which takes into account the number of ﬂights per-formed to carry out the intended business in a givenperiod of time. Finally, a key aspect is the validationof the initial assumptions that are inevitably madeboth for design and operations. As for ETOPS, alsoEHOPS requires a feedback of service data, to con-ﬁrm or reﬁne the initial assumptions based on ex-perience. It is clear that EHOPS management proce-dures are as important as EHOPS requirements.
5. NITROS CONTRIBUTION TO EHOPS SET-UP
In NITROS, a unique cross-disciplinary researchand training program was set up encompassingControl Engineering, Computational Fluid Dynam-ics (CFD), Modelling and Simulation, Structural Dy-namics, and Human perception cognition and ac-tion. The project is aligned with the European Unionendeavor to reduce the rate of aviation accidentsby tackling all critical aspects of rotorcraft technol-ogy. Twelve young researches are taking part in adynamic network composed by engineering schools(Politecnico di Milano, Liverpool University, GlasgowUniversity and Delft University), and industrial part-ners that include Leonardo Helicopters, a rotorcraftmanufacturer, Bristow, a major operator, CAA CivilAviation Authority in UK, a certiﬁcation body, EURO-CONTROL, a regulatory body, and two independentresearch centers: NLR The Netherlands AerospaceCentre, specializing in aviation research, and theMax Plank Institute for Biological Cybernetics, whichspecializes in all aspects related to human-machineinterface.Exploiting the analysis undertaken by the Euro-pean branch of the IHST 11, three main threats to ro-torcraft safety have been identiﬁed, which led to thefollowing three research objectives in NITROS:
• develop a detailed framework for rotorcraftmodeling, integrating rigid-body and aeroser-voelastic modeling features, capable of dealingwith structural, propulsion, or mechanical sys-tem failures;
• understand how humans can safely and eﬃ-ciently use and be interfaced with rotorcrafttechnology;
• enhance the understanding of the unique andcomplex aerodynamic environment in whichrotorcraft are working, often in hostile con-ditions of wake encounter threats, undesir-able interactions with obstacles, icing, andbrownout conditions.
The methodological approach developed withinthe NITROS training program will be focused onthe identiﬁcation of the interconnections that existamong the three pillars that are often overlookedduring the design.Each research program focuses on a problemthat affects the safety of current or future rotor-craft conﬁgurations. The possible implications ofthe problem in terms of manufacturing, operationsand certiﬁcation procedures will be thoroughly dis-cussed with the industrial partners.The NITROS researchers will develop two teamsto work on EHOPS.
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The ﬁrst team will focus on the aspects of EHOPSrelated to the interaction with the environment.In particular the aspects of systems reliability toensure EHOPS operation especially in case fail-ure, ﬂight in degraded environment, speciﬁc haz-ards, and take-off and landing procedure will be re-viewed.The second group will be more focused on theinteraction with humans, looking into aspects likelevels of automation and minimum levels to be re-quired in case of failure, and training levels and ca-pabilities required to perform offshore operationsin failure conditions.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The introduction of an extended operations stan-dard (EHOPS) for offshore helicopter operation isconsidered feasible even though speciﬁc peculiari-ties of rotorcraft design will set some challenges toovercome.The oil and gas and offshore operator industryover the years set in place several safety improve-ments and initiatives, related to offshore heli-deckstandard and landing procedures, health monitor-ing system employment, collision avoidance sys-tems, ﬂight in poor weather conditions, ﬂotationsystems. However, it is the time to transform allthose initiative into something more systematic topool the different experiences into a standard.This initiative, as it has been for the ETOPS, couldresult in one of the rare compromises that can leaveeveryone happy, a win-win situationwhere all actors(manufacturers, operators, regulators, passengers,aviation professionals, society at large) could gainadvantages.In this sense, also NITROS researchers, by giv-ing their contribution to EHOPS exploiting their indi-vidual expertise, may receive in return a signiﬁcantprofessional growth by deepening their knowledgeof operational safety.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The project NITROS has received funding from theEuropean Union’s Horizon 2020 research and inno-vation program under the Marie Skłodowska-Curiegrant agreement No. 721920.
REFERENCES
[1] Anonymous. IHST worldwide regional partnerpanel: Global update. Technical report, InternationHelicopter Safety Team, HAI Heli-Expo, Las Vegas,Nevada, 28 February 2018.
[2] Anonymous. Annual Safety Review 2017. EASA Euro-pean Aviation Safety Agency, 2017.[3] F. Harris, E. Kasper, and L. Iseler. Us civil rotorcraftaccidents, 1963 through 1997. Technical Report TM-2000-209597, NASA, December 2000.[4] Roy G Fox. The history of helicopter safety. In Inter-national Helicopter Safety Symposium, pages 26–29,2005.[5] J. Holden and N. Goel. Fast-forwarding to a futureof on-demand urban air transportation. Technicalreport, Uber Elevate, October 27th 2016.[6] Matteo Ragazzi. From ETOPS to helicopter EHOPS:The way forward. In 11th EASA Rotorcraft Symposium,Cologne, Germany, December 5–6 2017. EASA.[7] Matteo Ragazzi, Giorgio Dossena, Francesca Baro-sio, and Nigel Talbot. ETOPS operations applied tohelicopters. In 74th AHS Forum, Phoenix, AZ, USA,May 14–17 2018.[8] Anonymous. International Standard implementing asafety management system in design, manufacturingand mintenance organizations. ASD Aerospace andDefence Industries Association of Europe, 2017.[9] Anonymous. AMC 20 General Acceptable Means ofCompliance for Airworthiness of Products, Parts andAppliances, chapter AMC 20-6 Extended Range Oper-ation with Two-Engine Aeroplanes - ETOPS Certiﬁca-tion and Operation. EASA European Aviation SafetyAgency, 2017. Amendment 14.[10] G. Quaranta, G. Barakos, M. Mulder, M. Pavel, andM. White. NITROS an innovative training programto enhance rotorcraft safety. In 74th AHS Forum,Phoenix, AZ, USA, May 14–17 2018.[11] J. Stevens and J. Vreeken. The potential of technolo-gies to mitigate helicopter accident factors âĂŞ AnEHST study. Technical report, NLR, October 2014.[12] J.A. DeSantis. Engines turn or passengers swim: Acase study of how ETOPS improved safety and eco-nomics in aviation. Journal Air and Law and Com-merce, 77(3), 2013.
Presented at 44th European Rotorcraft Forum, Delft, The Netherlands, 19–20 September, 2018.
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution International License (CC BY). Copyright © 2018 by author(s).
Page 7 of 7
